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LAw WRITERS AND nm CouRTS. By Clyde E. Jacobs. Berkeley: University
of California Press. 1954. Pp. x, 223. $3.50.
To what extent do the writers of legal treatises-the "publicists"-influence
the courts in the decision of controversies before them? The author of this monograph has undertaken this difficult quest with respect to two principles (liberty
of contract and the public purpose requirement of taxation) and three text
writers of the post-Civil War period.
The first, Thomas M. Cooley, was chosen by the Michigan Senate to codify
the state statutes, served as reporter and later as a Justice of the Supreme Court
of Michigan, was a member of the first faculty of the University of Michigan
Law School, and was appointed a member and later chairman of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. His Constitutional Limitations, "the most fecund
source of laissez faire constitutional principles available during the [post-Civil
War] period" (p. 30) was published contemporaneously with the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The second, Christopher G. Tiedeman, was successively a member of the
faculty of the University of Missouri Law School, the law school of the University of the City of New York, and Dean of the law school at the University of
Buffalo. At the age of twenty-nine he published his Limitations of Police
Power-a work which, in Mr. Jacobs' opinion, "far more clearly sustained and
developed laissez faire constitutional principles than did that of Cooley, and
it was second only to the work of the latter in the influence it was to exercise
on bench and bar." (pp. 58-59)
The third, John F. Dillon, was both a physician and a lawyer, a member of
the Iowa Supreme Court and later United States Judge in Iowa, and still later
a professor in the Columbia University Law School as well as counsel for the
Union Pacific Railroad. Best known to most lawyers for his treatise on Municipal Corporations, he is characterized as one of the "foremost spokesmen for
laissez faire principles."
Mr. Jacobs concludes that "the works of Cooley and Tiedeman were instrumental in the formulation, development, and application of the liberty of contract principle as a limitation upon the police power of the states and the commerce power of the national government, and that the treatises of Cooley and
Dillon were of equal importance in making the public purpose maxim an
important restriction upon the taxing and spending powers of state and local
governments." (pp. v-vi) The three commentators selected, "not less than the
judges and the lawyers, were responsible for the popularization within their
profession of constitutional principles which encompassed the laissez faire policies demanded by industrial capitalists." (p. 4) He also concludes that the
influence of Cooley and Tiedeman was "most pronounced" in cases reviewing
statutes protecting labor unions, (p. 76) and that by supplying the judiciary
"with the materials whereby due process of the Fourteenth Amendment was
given life and whereby the corresponding clause of the Fifth Amendment was
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subsequently reanimated, the publicists contributed to a constitutional revolution paralleling the industrial revolution which was then taking place." (p. 22)
As a survey of the development of liberty of contract and public purpose
tax doctrines, especially in state constitutional interpretation, this monograph
deserves the attention of constitutional lawyers and historians. As a brief for
the influence which three publicists exercised during the half-century following
the Civil War, it is not persuasive, for five reasons.
First, the author requires the reader, in scores of instances throughout the
book, to accept court citation of a treatise as establishing a cause-and-effect relationship between the cited material and the decision reached.
Second, the cogency of the influence argument is diminished by the author's
admission that one of the reasons for the success of Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations was "the fact that the treatise, as its title indicates, emphasized limitations upon power rather than power itself" and this made it "readily compatible with prevailing economic and political ideas of the time." (p. 30) While
it is possible for works to be "readily compatible" with prevailing ideas and still
be influential, it is also suggestive that such works are caught in the tide of
influence stemming from an earlier change of direction in social or economic
thought.
Third, an advocate of the Jacobs' position might be troubled by the statement that Cooley's concepts of restraints upon the police power were "enormously suggestive" yet "in many respects, they were somewhat vague." (p. 106)
Similarly, the author concedes that Cooley's ideas on public purposes for taxation
were "not altogether consistent" yet they were "warmly received by bench and
bar." (p. 109) This may indicate Cooley's influence upon the courts, but it is
at least equally plausible that the ambiguity of Cooley's writings furnished
convenient receptacles into which the judges might pour their preconceptions
as to governmental power.1
Fourth, allegiance to the Jacobs thesis is also thwarted by several deficiencies
in the internal consistency of his argument. For example, we are told that "much
of the force and prestige" of Tiedeman's work "undoubtedly derived from its
logical consistency and rigor." (p. 62) Yet the author announces this conclusion
almost immediately after pointing out that Tiedeman "rejected the notion that
the courts could invalidate legislation because they regarded it as contrary to
principles of natural right and of abstract justice. But the force of this idea
was almost wholly destroyed by his acceptance, apparently without reservation,
of the doctrine of implied limitations on legislative power." (p. 60) Similarly,
the non sequitur of the following statement is apparent: "To a large extent the
rapid development of laissez faire in the state courts was due to the influence

1 A similar inference, as to the influence, of Tiedeman, might be drawn from this
statement. ''When other authorities were lacking on a given proposition of laissez faire or
when they were hostile to that proposition, the bench and bar might conlidently refer to
the works of Tiedeman for support. It was in this respect that he made his most notable
contribution." p. 62.
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of Cooley, for that writer exercised far greater influence upon those tribunals
than upon the United States Supreme Court." (p. 49) The fact that Cooley
exercised less influence upon the United States Supreme Court than upon the
state courts hardly establishes that the rapid development of laissez faire in the
latter was "due to the influence of Cooley."
Fifth, in an effort to accentuate the influence of his three selected writers,
Mr. Jacobs found it necessary to minimize the importance of other commentators in a way which invites rebuttal. Thus we are told that Ernst Freund's
Police Power, Public Policy and Constitutional Rights "was less original than
were the works of Cooley and Tiedeman .•." and "did not become a standard·
citation in judicial opinions," (p. 94) and that the reliance of state tribunals
upon the works of Cooley was "unparalleled in American judicial history." (p.
41) One may doubt whether the author has adequately documented these conclusions so as to subordinate to the work of these three men the writings of such
commentators as Kent and Story.
Richard. A. Ed.wards,

Associate Professor of
Government and. Law,
Lafayette College

